[“Nuqtah-e-Nazar” is a column reserved for writings by various thinkers.
The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the institution.]
In a workshop organized by the Idarah Talim o Tahqiq (ORE), I had the opportunity to speak for an hour and a half with a group of teachers from various religious schools representing different sects. The topic was “Religious Identities, Historical Context, and the Challenges Ahead.” Many significant questions were raised and addressed. The key points discussed can be summarized as follows:
In the Indian subcontinent, the religious identity of Muslims has historically been associated primarily with Sunni, Hanafi and Sufi Islam. However, due to various historical developments, identities such as Shiah Islam in contrast to Sunni Islam, Ahl-e-Hadith in contrast to Hanafi Islam, and Salafi Islam in contrast to Sufi Islam have also emerged. In more recent times, further layers have been added to this division—such as traditional versus modernist Islam, and missionary versus political Islam. With the advent of social media, these distinctions have not only become more fragmented but are now also appearing in the form of personal cults, where individual Islamic preachers are building their own followings.
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1. In this scenario, there appears to be little hope for reduction in these divisions, while the likelihood of further proliferation is very high. Apart from other historical reasons, a major cause is the structure of modern political power, which—unlike older forms—neither depends on any religious identity or law for its legitimacy and survival, nor does it feel bound by them. Instead, modern political power claims the right to control religious identities. In contrast, the premodern notion of Darul Islam was essentially a religious- political concept, in which rulers needed religious legitimacy and dependence on a particular interpretation of religion and jurisprudence to administer governance. This fundamental difference distinguishes even the most “Islamic” modern states from the earlier Darul Islam model.
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The concept of Darul Islam also included the notion that the ruler was responsible for eliminating deviant religious trends and curbing their spread. This often led to an alignment between political power and a specific religious interpretation, sometimes resulting in the persecution of opposing religious groups. The modern state, on the other hand, not only disavows such responsibilities but views itself as the guarantor of the fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms of all religious identities.
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Because many religious identities fail to understand the structural nature of modern political power—and remain mentally trapped in the historical past—the strategies they employ to assert themselves politically (such as takfir and tadlil against one another) have led to three inevitable consequences:
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i. A justification for secularization. ii. A justification for state surveillance and restrictions on religious expression. iii. Detachment from religion, aversion to it, and atheism.
Since the modern state is, by its nature, not dependent on any religious foundation for its legitimacy, any attempt by religious politics to force this association has been able to go only so far. At best, this connection remains symbolic and superficial—it has not translated into any real impact on the structure of state governance. However, in this tug-of-war, the moral credibility of religion and religious leadership has been severely damaged. Meanwhile, among those in authority, a growing awareness of the need for countermeasures is emerging. The consequences may take time to appear, but the signs are already visible.
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On the societal level, the sectarian conflict among religious identities has become so unsightly that the state—though unable to support any one group—has found justification to implement systems that regulate religious expression in the name of maintaining peace. At every administrative level, various types of peace committees, ulama’ boards, bans on sectarian literature, interfaith harmony declarations, and documents like Paigham-e-Pakistan are all manifestations of this development. Together, they send a clear message: if sectarian groups want to exist, they must behave like “good children” under state oversight and accountability.
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Because of the current survival strategy adopted by religious identities, the biggest challenge they now face is in the realm of retaining the younger generation—not just with regard to sectarian identity, but with religion itself. Here too, the religious analysis is not objective but built on unrealistic expectations. Religious groups believe that by making their identity stricter and less flexible, they can better preserve it. This analysis is completely flawed and leads to the opposite outcome. The younger generation simply does not have the patience to bear the burden of rigid, overbearing religious identities.
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Modern knowledge and the contemporary world have already made belief in basic religious tenets difficult enough. The insistence on interpretive additions and heavy-handed identity requirements only multiplies this difficulty.
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The first and most common stage of this crisis appears when every sect declares itself the “only saved group” by invoking the threat of the “72 deviant sects.” The emotional and moral pressure created by this claim becomes impossible to bear for any person with a basic sense of justice. If, among countless interpretations and differences, one specific sect holds the uniquely salvific truth—and if salvation depends on joining that one sect—then how many people can realistically devote themselves to researching and verifying this claim? And if salvation is possible by staying with one’s inherited sect without inquiry, then what distinction remains between one sect and another?
This is a mountain of a question, and no sect has an answer for it. But because no group is willing to make even the slightest concession, the natural psychological response of the individual is to disengage from the question altogether. That disengagement then turns into detachment from religion and disillusionment with religious ethics—and from there, the next step is often atheism.
Thus, the roots of atheism are not only in the external environment and modern culture, but also in the insistence on rigid sectarian interpretations and religious behavior itself. Ironically, in the effort to preserve religious identity, these attitudes are dismantling the very foundation—the bond with religion itself—upon which all religious identity depends.
This is my view. God knows best.