The term ijtihad originated from a Hadith. According to the scholars of Hadith, the narration is munqati‘ (disconnected), yet a single sentence from it became the basis of this important juristic concept in Islam. It is related that when the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) appointed Muadh ibn Jabal (RA) as governor of Yemen, he asked him, “How will you judge (between people)?” Muadh (RA) replied, “I will refer to the Book of Allah.” The Prophet (PBUH) asked, “If you do not find (a ruling) there?” He replied, “Then I will look to the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah.” The Prophet (PBUH) asked again, “And if you find nothing there either?” Muadh (RA) responded, “ajtahidu rayi, la alu” — “I will exert myself to form an opinion, leaving no effort untried.”
It is from these words — ajtahidu rayi — that the term ijtihad has been derived. The scholars of usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) have always employed it within the limits set by this Hadith: ijtihad pertains only to those matters about which the Quran and Sunnah are silent. It has no relevance to issues that the Quran and Sunnah have explicitly addressed. This is because the texts of the Quran and Sunnah are subjects for tadabbur (reflection), not for ijtihad (independent legislation).
The scholars may repeatedly return to these texts to ascertain their intent, and they may differ with their predecessors in interpretation, but they cannot alter or suspend any ruling or judgment established by them through their own reasoning. This is the precise scope of ijtihad.
If the narration of the Prophet (PBUH)’s conversation with Muadh (RA) is authentic, it clarifies exactly this reality. The Prophet (PBUH) asked: “If not in the Quran? If not in the Sunnah?” Once something is found in the Quran or Sunnah, a Muslim has no right to deviate from it. His faith requires that he submit to it without hesitation. The very meaning of Islam is to surrender oneself in obedience before Allah and His Messenger.
Some great modern thinkers have misunderstood certain rulings of the Rightly Guided Caliphs. In truth, none of them could ever have conceived of altering or suspending any divine command. What people sometimes perceive as abrogation or alteration is, in fact, an elucidation of the implications and consequences of divine commands, which the Caliphs made clear through their practical judgments. Rather than seeing in this a justification for modification or suspension, one should learn from it how to reflect upon the Quran and Sunnah and understand their modes of expression.
Within this defined sphere, ijtihad is as essential to a Muslim’s life as air and water. Its door can never be closed — and in reality, it never has been. Despite assertions by some that it was shut after the fourth century Hijrah, scholars, jurists, and experts in various disciplines have continued to engage in ijtihad in every age — and continue to do so even today. Allah Almighty has endowed human beings with intellect and knowledge precisely so that they may use these faculties to make judgments in their affairs. Human affairs are numerous and ever-changing. Man is neither blind nor deaf that he must always rely on direct heavenly guidance for every matter. The divine law was revealed only in those areas where intellect and reason required direction, and that is why its injunctions are few and limited.
Hence, ijtihad is indispensable — it is the key to progress. Without it, life cannot advance. One major reason for the decline of Muslims is that, as a community, they have lost the capacity for scientific inquiry in the natural sciences and for ijtihad in the social sciences.
It must also be clarified that ijtihad has no fixed preconditions. People must engage in it. Some will err, but others will critique and correct them — and it is through this process that human understanding advances and great mujtahids eventually emerge.
Indeed, if one accepts the principle of taqlid (blind following), then all the so-called conditions for ijtihad become necessary — because in that case, the focus shifts from the reasoning itself to the authority of the jurist whose opinion is followed. However, if, like the Companions and their successors, both the learned and the layperson base their decisions upon evidence, then it is the ijtihad itself that must be evaluated — not the personality of the mujtahid.
In such a case, even if a non-Muslim proposes a rational and effective solution to a problem, there would be no objection in accepting it. It would be treated as dallatul mumin — “the lost property of the believer,” which he is entitled to reclaim wherever he finds it.
Indeed, in the modern age, most ijtihads concerning political systems, economic organization, administration, and principles of citizenship have been made by non-Muslims — and Muslims, by and large, have accepted them. A clear example of this is democracy, its values, and the institutional frameworks that arise from it. The Quran gave the principle of consultation (shura), yet Muslims never succeeded in constructing a concrete system upon it. That system was developed by non-Muslims. Despite this, one can observe that Muslim scholars, jurists, and most religious parties have not only accepted it but have also actively worked for its promotion and preservation.
In all matters on which the Quran and Sunnah are silent, this is the correct attitude — and it is upon this that Muslims must continue to stand firm.
[2011]