The guidance granted by Allah through His prophets has, at its core, the Quran and the Sunnah. The principles necessary for the understanding and explication of these two sources have already been set forth in the introduction Usul wa Mabadiʾ of my book, Meezan. A concise summary under this same heading may also be consulted in the present work. Beyond these, derivatively, if there is any legitimate means of reaching God’s intent, it is through ijtihad. By this method, together with other means, we seek to comprehend those rulings which are not stated explicitly in the revealed texts, but which—by their very nature—are extensions and applications of the same. In this regard, qiyas constitutes a category of ijtihad. The Quran itself employs the term istinbat for such derivations. The body of knowledge that arises through this process is called fiqh. A major portion of it is what we may designate Fiqh al-Nabi (Jurisprudence of the Prophet). Following this are the juristic efforts of scholars and jurists. The expression Usul al-Fiqh is employed precisely to denote the principles required to understand and explain matters within this sphere. These principles are as follows:
1. Every opinion concerning religion must be founded upon the purpose of religion itself, as defined in the Quran. In our view, this purpose is the purification (tazkiyah) of man’s knowledge and deeds in all dimensions of his individual and collective life. In assessing solitary reports (akhbar ahad), and in adopting or rejecting any opinion or exercise of ijtihad, this objective of religion must remain the guiding principle.
2. By ‘Quran and Sunnah’ in this context we mean not only their explicit rulings but also the underlying causes (ilal) and general maxims (qawaid ammah) upon which the Shariah is constructed—whether they are explicitly mentioned in the texts or identified through inductive reasoning. An example of the first case is: “Allah has declared all good things (tayyibāt) lawful and all impure things (khabaith) unlawful.” An example of the second is: “All acts of worship are symbolic expressions of the servant’s relationship with Allah.”
3. Fiqh is entirely a derivative of these rulings, causes, and general maxims. It must always remain in this subordinate position. Should it transgress its subordinate role, displacing or altering the purport of the originals, it must necessarily be rejected.
4. Every ruling of religion is bound to its intrinsic reality—its meaning and cause. The application of this ruling to new circumstances, as well as exemptions or dispensations from it, must be determined on the basis of that intrinsic reality.
5. The recognized modes of reasoning employed are three: a. First, reasoning from the branch (farʿ) to the root (asl), for the existence of the branch presupposes the root.
b. Second, reasoning from the root to the branch, since the root necessarily entails its branches; thus, contemplation of the root discloses all its implied branches. For this reason, the root is called asl and the branch farʿ.
c. Third, reasoning from one branch to another, mediated by the proof of the root. The branch first indicates its root, which then establishes connection with all related branches.
6. The importance of Fiqh al-Nabi in this discipline is extraordinary. Much of it has reached us through solitary reports. Given the gravity of attributing anything to the Prophet (PBUH), such reports may only be accepted when they are at least of the status of Hasan according to the terminology of the muhaddithun. Weak reports, if transmitted through multiple chains, may be cited in matters of administrative or regulatory decisions, to provide additional reassurance. The reason is that in such matters the primary foundation for reasoning is the self-evident truths of knowledge and reason. For instance, if divorce is pronounced in a manner that contravenes the prescribed procedure, the response to this situation is essentially an administrative ruling. In such a case, the presence of a weak hadith to support the ruling adds a measure of reassurance. The case of Rukanah bin Abd Yazid’s divorce is a pertinent example. The narrations of Abu Dawud, Ibn Majah, Tirmidhi, and Musnad Ahmad have been cited in my book Meezan under Qanun-e-Muasharat precisely in this capacity, with the clarification noted in the footnotes that while the reports are weak in isnad, their collective attestation compensates for individual weakness.
[2022]