Prayer holds paramount importance as an act of worship in Islam. The actions prescribed for this worship in the Shari’ah are firmly established through consensus and tawātur. The Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) meticulously performed these deeds and instructed his followers to observe prayers in the manner they saw him doing. The timing and actions for each prayer have been distinctly specified. Nonetheless, some concessions have been allowed for believers in specific circumstances.
The Almighty states in the Holy Quran:
This verse grants permission for the shortening of prayers, known as “qasr,” considering a particular situation. Just as the Muslim Ummah learned the actions of prayer from the Holy Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), they learned about shortening the prayer (qasr) from the Sunnah of the Prophet when the Holy Quran announced this concession.
Addressing the rationale behind the verse allowing the shortening of prayers in specific conditions, it is evident that during times of war, individuals must remain vigilant and prepared to fight.
When you travel [to wage this jihād], it is no offense for you to shorten your prayers if you fear that the disbelievers may torment you because these disbelievers are your open enemies. (Q 4:101) whereas the people are now safe. He replied: “I pondered over it just as you are doing now. So, I asked the
Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) about it, & he said: ‘It is an act of charity that Allah has bestowed upon you, so accept His charity.'”
This demonstrates that if the situation described by the
Quran with the condition of ‘in-khiftum’ (if you are afraid) is found elsewhere, causing anxiety, chaos, and confusion, the same concession will be applicable.
For example, if a doctor performing surgery fears missing prayer time or firefighters during emergency operations extinguishing fires wish to offer prayers, they are permitted to shorten the prayer.
Hence, undivided attention and time are necessary for this purpose. Similarly, when embarking on a journey for war, the human psyche is consumed with strategic planning, defense, and fear. In such circumstances, it is crucial to abstain from activities unrelated to the situation so that one can wholly focus on the impending task. The Quran deems prayer so significant that even amidst the perils of war, Allah has granted permission to shorten it.
The subsequent question arises: Is it permissible to shorten prayers in other situations that emulate the chaos, anxiety, and panic of war? Logically, it should be so because if permission is granted for a specific reason, it should be applicable wherever that reason exists. Therefore, based on rational and natural principles, the
Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) inferred from this verse that anxiety, chaos, and unease during ordinary journeys create a state of fear, thus allowing the shortening of prayers.
The Prophet’s (PBUH) application of this concession to similar circumstances has been documented in various hadith reports. For instance, Ibn ‘Abbās (may Allah be pleased with him) narrated that while traveling with the
Messenger of Allah (peace & blessings of Allah be upon him) from Madinah to Makkah, even though there was no fear from anyone except Allah, they offered only two rakahs until their return.
Regarding the Prophet’s (PBUH) analogical reasoning based on this verse to apply the permission in situations resembling chaos, anxiety, & unease, Umar bin Khaṭṭāb (RTA) queried the Prophet’s (PBUH) rationale, as evident in a particular hadith report:
Ya‘lā bin Umayyah mentioned: I informed ‘Umar bin. al-Khaṭṭāb that Allah had said,
You may shorten the prayer only if you fear that those who are unbelievers may afflict you۔ (Qur’an 4:101)
Syed Matīn Ahmad, a contemporary learned scholar, has highlighted the Prophet’s
(PBUH) analogical reasoning (قیاس) from this verse of Surah al-Nisā’ within the context of the discussion on the sovereignty of words (Alfāz ki Ḥākmiyyat) as perceived by the Farahi school of thought. He writes:
“In this regard, since the ‘rule of the words of the Qur’an’ does not seem to explicitly elucidate the ruling on shortening the prayer during an ordinary journey, it compelled Javed Ahmad Ghamidi to explore “traditions (riwāyah)” and “analogical reasoning (qiyās).” The real question arises here: Can an isolated report (Khabr-ewahid) introduce a new commandment to the religion or not?”
It is important to clarify that Javed Ahmad Ghamidi did not reference tradition in his exegesis “Al-Bayān” and his book “Meezan” to establish the concession of Qasr prayer in an ordinary journey. He explicitly stated that the action of the Messenger of
Allah (pbuh), transmitted to us, is based on analogical reasoning (qiyās) from this verse of the Quran. Had it not been for this analogical reasoning (qiyās) by the
Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), scholars could have studied this verse and drawn their conclusions through analogical reasoning. That would have been considered ijtihad by scholars, just as they seek guidance based on the illah of Shariah rulings. This entire process has absolutely nothing to do with the discussion on the sovereignty of words. The question raised by the learned scholar would have been convincing if Mr. Ghamidi had stated that this process of inference would be carried out without considering the reasons mentioned in the words of the verse. The Farahi school of thought consistently asserts that the only means to derive commandments and guidance from the Holy Quran is through its words. If the words convey speech to transmit an illah or reason to us, we can apply that illah to similar conditions. Therefore, it should be clarified that the words of the
Quran do not elucidate the reason being applied.
The scholar further writes:
“The second question is raised by Mr. Ghamidi, who asserts that the Prophet employed analogical reasoning (qiyās) regarding the anxiety, fear, and discomfort experienced during a war journey to his other journeys, thus shortening his prayers.
Does this, in principle, not validate that qiyās, which serves as the interpretation of the principle of fiqh, elucidates the command (muẓhar-e-ḥukm)? If, as evident from
Mr Ghamidi’s explanation, this is muẓhar-e-ḥukm, and since the majority of Islamic fiqh is derived from this very principle, why should it be dismissed as human understanding?”
The scholar questions whether this tradition of analogical reasoning (qiyās) based on the Quranic instructions is an attempt to comprehend the implications of the ruling and its applications in new scenarios, which is significantly prevalent in
Islamic fiqh, and yet rejected as human understanding.
In response, it is imperative to ask the researcher if, in his view, Mr. Ghamidi rejects the entire process of analogical reasoning (qiyās) and ijtihad as mere human understanding. The following excerpt from Ghamidi’s discourse on ijtihad adequately answers this query:
“The only source of religion is the personality and attributes of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him). The religion comes through consensus of his companions and the verbal and practical transmission to reach us in two ways: the
Holy Quran and the Sunnah. After the Prophet, the religion spreads through these two major sources. The only thing that naturally accomplishes the requirement of reaching out to the will of God is Ijtihad. Through this, we try to understand many divine rulings regarding other matters which have not been explained in the original text of these sources, but by their very nature, they have applications that have been left to the opinion and understanding of the people. Analogical reasoning (qiyās) is a type of this. The Holy Quran uses the word istimbāṭ to describe it. The production it yields is known as Fiqh. It was started by the Holy Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) with his ijtihad. A major chunk of the isolated reports (akhbār e āḥād) is employed to explain it. The companions and their successors also maintained this tradition” (muqāmāt, 156).
This statement from Mr. Ghamidi elucidates that using analogical reasoning (qiyās) in light of Quranic teachings does not challenge the divine speech through the application of akhbār e āḥād, qiyās, and khārij. Rather, it is an endeavor to comprehend the divine will by drawing parallels with a similar situation. Analogical reasoning by anyone other than a prophet remains subject to varying opinions. Only the divine messengers possess the authority where their ijtihad gains divine backing in all religious matters. Others are free to use analogical reasoning and derive conclusions based on their knowledge and understanding. Therefore, if there is a debate, it should be based on the correctness or incorrectness of this analogical reasoning.