Sir Syed’s Theological Thought and Methodology: an Analytical Study

Sir Syed wrote on a wide range of subjects, yet the central aspect of his thought relates to Ilm al-Kalam (Islamic theology). As the herald of Islamic modernism in the Indian subcontinent, he sought to advance the project of reconstruction of Islamic thought. It appears that the term modern Ilm al-Kalam was first used in this region by Sir Syed himself,⁸ though the task of developing and systematizing this intellectual enterprise was mainly undertaken by Shibli Nu‘mani. In this regard, Shibli’s book Al-Kalam was the first Urdu treatise on the subject.

According to Sir Syed’s thought, the foremost requirement of the modern age was to reconstruct Islamic intellectual tradition on rational foundations. He made this the focal point of his intellectual endeavor, formulated the principles of modern theology, and sought harmony between reason (aql) and revelation (naql) in light of those principles. There is no doubt that in doing so he often stumbled, fell into intellectual fallacies, and the erroneous conclusions drawn from faulty premises left negative effects on many minds. Yet, this was not unprecedented in the history of Islamic thought. The rich intellectual tradition of Islam has evolved through diverse tendencies and philosophical engagements throughout the ages.

This article attempts to examine Sir Syed’s theological thought and methodology, to evaluate its intellectual worth and to bring out both its positive and negative aspects.

Sir Syed’s Contribution to Theology

Sir Syed turned his attention to the reconstruction of Ilm al-Kalam at a time when very few minds in the Muslim world were reflecting on this issue. Among his contemporaries were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Mufti Muhammad Abduh, both eminent reformist thinkers from other parts of the Muslim world. However, while Afghani focused primarily on political reform within Islam, Mufti Abduh emphasized the renewal of Islamic religious thought. Yet, his work Risalat al-Tawhid,⁹ based on the philosophical framework of ancient Greek thought, could not adequately address the intellectual challenges posed by modernity.¹⁰

In contrast, Sir Syed took Islamic thought as a whole as his subject—especially Islamic theology (divine metaphysics)—and sought to reformulate it in accordance with contemporary rational demands. In fact, Shibli derived inspiration and courage from Sir Syed’s intellectual initiative, which led him to author significant works such as Ilm al-Kalam and Al-Kalam. It can thus be said that Sir Syed laid the foundations of modern theology in the Indian subcontinent, Shibli was the first to delineate its framework systematically, and Iqbal ultimately presented it as a coherent philosophical system.

Sir Syed was the first to emphasize, with full intellectual vigor, that the corpus of Ilm al-Kalam—developed within the mold of Greek philosophy and logic and still taught in our seminaries—had become obsolete in the modern age. It was widely recognized that just as Greek philosophy once emerged as a rival to religion during the Abbasid period, modern science had now assumed that position in the contemporary era. But it was Sir Syed who articulated this shift forcefully and made it a matter of intellectual consciousness.

The dominance of Asharite thought had created extremes in reconciling reason and revelation. The Maturidi school, though it sought to restore balance between Mutazilism and Asharism, could not remove the prevailing Asharite influence in this region. Sir Syed struck a powerful blow against that dominance and set before himself the goal of reviving the long-suppressed philosophical tradition of Islam. His efforts were not without effect; they left a lasting intellectual impact. As Iqbal wrote:

“He was the first Indian Muslim to feel the need for a modern orientation of Islam, and not only did he perceive this necessity, he also worked upon it. We may differ with Sir Syed’s religious views, yet we cannot deny that it was his restless spirit that first sensed the challenge of the modern age and strove to reinterpret Islam in its light.”¹¹

Sir Syed’s Theological Method and Its Characteristics

A substantial body of literature has been written in refutation of Sir Syed’s theological views, beginning even during his own lifetime. Yet, it is a fact that few have examined his theological thought with intellectual seriousness and impartiality. Most analyses have focused primarily on highlighting the shortcomings of his religious thought. There is no denying that deviations are indeed evident in his theology, but within the broader Islamic intellectual tradition, these are not entirely alien.

Sir Syed’s thought is often presented in connection with Mutazilism, giving the impression that his entire intellectual framework was molded in Mutazilite thought. This is not entirely accurate. While he did follow the Mu‘tazila in certain issues—such as affirming, like them, that the divine attributes are identical with the divine essence, and siding with them completely on the question of the intrinsic goodness or badness (Husn wa qubh) of things—his core religious outlook was in fact more deeply influenced by the Muslim philosophers such as al-Farabi, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), and Ibn Rushd (Averroes).

Under the Neoplatonic influence, al-Farabi and Ibn Sina interpreted Islamic metaphysics in such a way as to reconcile reason and revelation. Sir Syed’s rationalist temperament found this approach congenial. Consequently, concepts such as prophethood, Gabriel, angels, jinn, resurrection, and heaven and hell underwent reinterpretation in his thought. He adopted explanations close to those of the philosophers, often interpreting them figuratively rather than literally.

For instance, al-Farabi viewed a prophet as a person whose imaginative faculty (quwwah mutakhayyilah) had attained perfection and whose soul had become detached from sensory perception—allowing it to receive emanation from the Active Intellect (aql faal).¹² In this scheme, no external agency mediates revelation to the prophet. Sir Syed similarly referred to the inner faculty within the prophet himself as quwwat-e-jibriliyyah¹³—the “Gabrielic faculty.” The underlying idea in both views is the same.

Despite all their rationalism, the Mutazilites—unlike the philosophers—remained within or close to the orthodox framework of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamaah in their understanding of prophethood and the afterlife. In these matters, their divergence from the Muslim philosophers is quite pronounced.

Viewed from this perspective, Sir Syed did not introduce an entirely new intellectual paradigm; rather, he sought to revive and follow the same rationalist line of thought whose vitality had been largely curtailed by al-Ghazali.¹⁴ Though weakened, that tradition had not vanished altogether, for Ibn Rushd’s philosophy continued to find acceptance among a circle of learned scholars. In essence, Sir Syed aligned himself with Ibn Rushd in opposition to al-Ghazali and endeavored to advance the Rationalist (Rushdian) outlook in the modern age through new arguments and reasoning. Just as he had studied al-Ghazali in detail, he had also benefited deeply from Ibn Rushd’s philosophical ideas. He understood the foundational principles of Ibn Rushd’s thought, which aided him in shaping his own intellectual methodology.

In my view, the true originality of Sir Syed’s thought does not lie in offering a rational justification of Islamic metaphysics per se, but in applying this philosophical mode of reasoning to the exegesis of the Quran. It was precisely this approach that provoked widespread opposition to him. Within the Sunni intellectual framework, Sir Syed was the first in the modern era to employ this philosophical perspective systematically in Quranic interpretation.

To grasp the essential direction of Sir Syed’s theological methodology, one must refer to his treatise Tahrir fi Usul al-Tafsir (“A Treatise on the Principles of Exegesis”). There, he enumerated fifteen principles of Quranic interpretation through which he sought to clarify his hermeneutical position. In addition, his correspondence with Maulana Qasim Nanautawi—later published under the title Tasfiyyat al-ʿAqaid—and several of his essays further expound certain of these principles. Taking all these writings together, the contours of Sir Syed’s theological and rational methodology may be understood under three fundamental headings, which capture the essential aspects of his system.

The Principle of Nature (Usul al-Fitrah)

One of Sir Syed’s most fundamental principles is that which he articulated in relation to the Law of Nature. According to him, the law of nature upon which the order of the universe rests is the “Work of God,” a practical covenant, whereas revelation (the Quran) is the “Word of God,” a verbal covenant. Since both proceed from the same divine source, conflict or contradiction between them is impossible. The law of nature is immutable and invariable; therefore, any interpretation of revelation that leads to opposition or contradiction with it must be deemed incorrect.¹⁵

One may claim, he concedes, that exceptions to the law of nature are possible; however, he insists that such exceptions cannot be proved. In his own words:

“Rational possibility (imkan aqli) is not an existent reality; it is merely a mental supposition devoid of actuality.”¹⁶

Sir Syed’s critics strongly attacked this position, but their criticisms only made him more resolute in it.

Al-Ghazali, for his part, had classified the naturalists (tabiyyun) of his time among the heretical groups, because, according to him, they denied the re-creation of the annihilated (iadah al-madum),¹⁷ thereby rejecting the afterlife and the realities of Paradise and Hell.¹⁸ In contrast, Sir Syed, while criticizing al-Ghazali, counted himself—positively and consciously—among the naturalists.¹⁹

Ignoring the metaphysical intricacies of the debate on iadah al-madum, Sir Syed held firmly to its implications: that bodily resurrection is impossible, and that Paradise and Hell are metaphorical, not literal realities. Al-Ghazali, on the other hand, regarded any allegorical interpretation (tawil) of eschatological realities as tantamount to their denial and, consequently, an act of disbelief. On this very ground, he had pronounced Ibn Sina and al-Farabi unbelievers.²⁰ Sir Syed, however, was a severe critic of this view.²¹ He argued that al-Ghazali’s position was internally inconsistent: in al-Iqtisad fi al-Itiqad he treated the Balance (Mizan) and certain other aspects of the Hereafter as real, whereas in al-Madnun bihi ala ghayri ahlihi he took them metaphorically.²²

Although Sir Syed’s insistence on making this principle—the harmony of revelation and nature—the key to Quranic interpretation was certainly misplaced, his stance, nonetheless, stands intellectually closer to that of the Muslim philosophers (falasifah). Influenced by Greek philosophy, these thinkers interpreted existential reality primarily through rational demonstration (burhan), and insisted that scriptural interpretation must conform to this demonstrative truth.

As Ibn Rushd writes in Fasl al-Maqal:

ونحن نقطع قطعاا أن كل ما أدى إليه البرهان وخالفه ظاهر الشرع، أن ذلك الظاهر يقبل التأويل على قانون التأويل

العربي. وهذه القضية ْل يشك فيها مسلم وْل يرتاب بها مؤمن. وما أعظم ازدياد اليقين بها عند من زاولهذا المعنى

وجربه وقصد هذا المقصد من الجمع بين المعقول والمنقول. “We hold with absolute certainty that whenever a demonstrative proof (burhan) leads to a conclusion that conflicts with the apparent meaning of the Law, that apparent meaning must be interpreted figuratively, according to the principles of Arabic interpretation. No Muslim can doubt this, nor can any believer hesitate in accepting it. Indeed, those who have pursued the reconciliation of reason and revelation, and have experienced this process, find their conviction in this truth only deepened.”²³

Ibn Rushd’s position is explicit: whenever the apparent meaning of revelation contradicts demonstrative reason, the text must be interpreted in light of reason—not the other way around. Thus, within his rational project, revelation becomes subordinate, and reason assumes primacy.

Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, explaining the epistemological difference between al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd, observed that for al-Ghazali, knowledge descends from the world of the unseen (malakut) through revelation to the world of sensory experience, whereas for Ibn Rushd it ascends in the opposite direction—from the natural world to the metaphysical realm. The natural world, in his view, is the necessary prelude to metaphysical understanding.²⁴

Sir Syed essentially subscribed to the same perspective. He absorbed the influence of European naturalists, for in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries naturalistic thought had become increasingly dominant, and much of Europe’s anti-clerical intellectual activity was shaped by it. Yet it would be incorrect to say that Sir Syed’s thought originated in this Western trend. Rather, he found within the Islamic intellectual tradition itself a similar rationalist inclination, upon which he built his system—while benefiting further from modern Western naturalism.

The distinction lies in this: whereas Ibn Rushd sought to comprehend the “existential reality” within the universal framework of Greek philosophy, Sir Syed reinterpreted that same reality under the Principle of Nature, integrating it with the modern scientific worldview as a structural element of his own thought.

The Theory of Tawil (Interpretation)

The issue of tawil—the figurative or interpretive understanding of scriptural texts—has been a subject of debate and contention within the Islamic intellectual tradition from its earliest period. The muhaddithun (traditionists) generally reject the idea of tawil altogether, a stance systematized and reinforced through rigorous argumentation by Ibn Taymiyyah. On the other hand, the philosophers (falasifah) give tawil a central place in understanding revelation and seek to interpret Islamic metaphysics in light of it. Between these two extremes stand the Asharites and the Mutazilites—the former employing tawil with great caution, and the latter using it with relative freedom.

Sir Syed, in principle, adopted the philosophical position, yet in several specific issues he appears closer to the Mutazilites. For example, he does not accept the notion of rational possibility (imkan aqli) or mental existence (wujud dhihni), though these are universally acknowledged among the Greek and Muslim philosophers. Moreover, the Muslim philosophers hold that a prophet may, for the sake of public comprehension, express something contrary to reality if the people are incapable of grasping the truth. Sir Syed rejects this idea. However, he does concede:

“If people are accustomed to certain ideas, and those ideas are not contrary to the purposes of prophethood but rather supportive of them, then the prophets do not concern themselves with their truth or falsehood; instead, they address people in accordance with those very ideas.”²⁵

In the matter of tawil, Sir Syed’s position diverges significantly from almost all schools that advocate interpretation. For him, tawil means that if the apparent meaning of a statement does not conform to reason or fact, then one must seek another meaning that renders the statement correct and coherent:

“When the apparent meaning of a statement is found inconsistent with reality, then other meanings should be adopted so that the statement becomes true. And if it is established that the speaker’s real intention was precisely that meaning which is revealed through interpretation, then that is not tawil but rather the exposition of the speaker’s actual intent.”²⁶

Ordinarily, tawil among the interpreters of old means abandoning the literal meaning of a word in favor of a figurative one—for example, using asad (lion) to mean a brave man rather than the animal. Sir Syed, however, does not regard this as tawil. In his view, such usage simply means that the speaker intended the figurative sense directly. His approach thus approximates that of the muhaddithun, who deny that such instances constitute tawil. According to Sir Syed, meanings that are conventionally labeled “metaphorical,” such as interpreting yad (hand) as “power,” are already inherent in the semantic range of the word from the very outset of linguistic usage. Hence, he maintains that a word’s signification includes all such connotations and that there is no need to treat them as secondary or derivative meanings.²⁷

A second major feature of Sir Syed’s concept of tawil is his belief that the miraculous character of Quranic language lies precisely in its dynamic and evolving meanings. The meanings of its words, he argues, cannot be confined to fixed and final interpretations.²⁸ He adopted this view mainly to shield himself from the objection that his rational reconciliation of the Work of God (natural law) and the Word of God (revelation)—based on contemporary scientific theories—would collapse once those theories changed.

The objection to Sir Syed’s position is indeed substantial, whereas his response to it carries little weight. The question that arises is: what significance remains for words and idioms that serve as the very foundation and measure of meaning, once it is assumed that any possible interpretation—red, white, black, or otherwise—is equally valid? If one allows for the possibility that “earth” might signify “heaven” and “heaven” might signify “earth,” then the text itself loses all intrinsic importance. In fact, this approach no longer explains the text but rather invents it. Such a stance closely resembles the Western hermeneutic approach to textual interpretation, according to which, after the author’s death, it is up to the reader to determine how and on what basis meanings are to be derived from the text.

Sir Syed studied Al-Ghazali’s thought on tawil (interpretation), and he was acquainted with Al-Ghazali’s principal writings on the subject,²⁹ in which the latter sought to establish essential principles and rules for legitimate interpretation. Especially in his Qanun al-Tawil, Al-Ghazali advanced a balanced interpretive framework between the two extreme tendencies of the traditionalists (muhaddithun) and the rationalists (Mutazilah). Sir Syed, however, held that declaring anyone an unbeliever (takfir) is impermissible unless that person independently derives a meaning of the most explicit Quranic verse that contradicts its clear intent. In this way, he effectively grants every individual the personal right of interpretation—no matter what kind of tawil he employs to justify his position.

In this regard, Sir Syed seems unwilling to accept any fixed principles or boundaries. Al-Ghazali, by contrast, had laid down that tawil is impermissible in the fundamentals of faith (usul al-iman), which, according to him, are three: belief in God, belief in the Messenger, and belief in the Hereafter. Beyond these essentials, tawil may apply only to subsidiary matters (furu), and even then not to what is established by tawatur (definitive transmission)—for instance, the fact that the Kabah is located in Makkah, or the exoneration of Ayshah (RA) from the slander of Ifk, which is explicitly affirmed in the Quran.³⁰

Sir Syed, however, strongly criticizes this position and argues that even in such matters an individual should be free to interpret. He contends, for example, that one might claim that the original Kabah burned down in the time of Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr, and that when he rebuilt it, al-Hajjaj demolished it again³¹—so a person could, in principle, understand the term Kabah differently. By such reasoning, the obvious and apparent meaning (mana mutabadar ila al-dhihn) loses all formal authority—the very foundation upon which the scholars of usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) had insisted.

Similarly, while Sir Syed, following the classical scholars, insists on adhering to the Arabic language and idiom in interpretation, he simultaneously declares that Arabic itself is probabilistic (ẓanni) in nature.³² In matters of vocabulary and usage, he advances an independent theoretical claim: that exegetes typically determine a word’s meaning according to their own predispositions and then seek lexical confirmation in the poetry of the pre-Islamic Arabs. According to Sir Syed, since much of that poetry has been lost, any attempt to prove a meaning by appealing to it is logically precarious—one may as well assume that the needed evidence once existed but is now lost.

Adopting such concepts regarding the Arabic language became a necessity for Sir Syed so that an unlimited scope for interpretive freedom could remain available in understanding and explaining the text. However, he failed to reflect on the logical consequence of rejecting this linguistic standard—namely, that in doing so, the established existence of definitive (muhkam) meanings within the Quran is abolished, rendering the entire text ambiguous (mutashabih). As a result, the very foundation of faith collapses, since it cannot be built upon doubt or conjecture.

Moreover, he did not consider how the charge against the Divine Lawgiver could then be refuted—that God has obligated human beings to believe in and act upon matters that are vague, unclear, and therefore inherently uncertain, while making them the basis of eternal salvation or damnation. Sir Syed, according to his own formulated principles, regards the tawil (interpretation) of Quranic verses as disbelief (kufr).³³

However, these meanings of tawil are the product of Sir Syed’s own intellectual construction. His reasoning seems to be: why should he not have the right to establish principles for understanding and interpreting sacred texts, and why should this right remain confined to figures such as Imam al-Shafi or Ibn Taymiyyah? In principle, this may appear justifiable, yet the meaning of tawil he presents is neither linguistically accurate nor consistent with the discourse of the Divine Lawgiver.³⁴ Thus, apart from silence, no viable alternative remains. The truth is that Sir Syed’s thought concerning tawil is, in principle, marked by extremity and imbalance.

[To be continued….]