In February, when the Supreme Court delivered its verdict on the Mubarak Sani case, it felt like a bombshell for the religious community. The reason was that the religious circles had never truly attempted to understand the state and judicial perspectives on the legislation concerning Ahmadis. Despite repeated clarifications from the judiciary, the religious groups continued to pursue their own interpretations. In this case, the principle of religious freedom in private domains appeared to be applied to a new issue, namely the publication and distribution of religious literature by the Ahmadi community. However, this principle had been well-established in the legal and judicial framework from the beginning. For religious groups in general, and particularly for the religious leadership, this situation felt like an unforeseen disaster. The immediate response from the religious and political leadership was aggressive and based on ignorance of the case’s details.
In this context, the religious circles had no immediate option but to resort to protests, condemnations, and accusations of conspiracies to salvage their public image. In March, after a request for a review of the case was filed, certain leaders, particularly from the Majlis Tahaffuz Khatm-e-Nabuwwat (International Council for the Protection of the Finality of Prophethood), like Maulana Allah Wasaya, launched a negative propaganda campaign against the Chief Justice and his secretary, Dr. Mushtaq Ahmad. They employed the familiar and tested strategy of issuing fatwas to pressure the judiciary. However, this strategy failed, and by the end of July, the reviewed decision, even more detailed and clearer than before, ruled against the traditional religious stance.
At this stage, various Deobandi organizations escalated their personal attacks and issued more severe fatwas. Some Deobandi leaders went as far as to declare that the Chief Justice was no longer eligible for the intercession of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), as though these individuals had been assigned the role of screening candidates for the Prophet’s intercession—God forbid. The situation worsened when Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) and its allied elements joined the fray, issuing fatwas of apostasy and calling for the Chief Justice’s assassination, attempting to steer the matter in the same direction as the Salman Taseer and Aasia Bibi cases.
Amid this turmoil, the senior Deobandi leadership faced three major challenges that required simultaneous attention:
1. Representing the religious viewpoint before the judiciary, 2. Navigating a path of dialogue with state institutions amidst the hostile environment created by the factions within their ranks, and 3. Preventing the situation from being hijacked by extremist groups like Tehreek-e-Labbaik.
The Deobandi leadership gradually took charge of representing the religious perspective on a national level, presenting a more balanced stance and appropriately reprimanding irresponsible elements for their personal attacks and abusive language. In this regard, my father, Maulana Zahid al-Rashidi, published an important article on June 29 in Roznama Islam titled “Non- Muslim Citizens of the Islamic State of Medina,” in which he drew upon the Prophet’s life to emphasize different aspects of prudence and wisdom. He conveyed the message that religious leadership and state institutions should seek a resolution to this crisis through mutual consultation, keeping these considerations in mind. During this discussion, my father also shared the following statement on social media titled “A Bitter Experience and Observation”:
“During the 1974 Khatm-e-Nabuwwat movement, when I was the General Secretary of the Gojranwala All-Party Council for the Protection of the Finality of Prophethood, a senior religious leader and I went to the Assistant Commissioner of Gojranwala to request permission for a Khatm-e-Nabuwwat rally in a nearby town. When the Assistant Commissioner hesitated, my companion immediately asked, ‘You’re not an Ahmadi, are you?’ The AC responded, ‘Respected sir, don’t insult me like that; I’ll grant the permission.’ After we left the office, I said to my companion, ‘What did you just do?’ He replied, ‘Without that, we wouldn’t have gotten permission.’ At the time, I considered it an individual disposition and overlooked it. But after half a century of continuous experience and observation, I’ve come to realize that in certain circles, this approach may even be systematically trained. Consequently, this “art” has now grown into a widespread problem for the entire nation. May Allah have mercy on us all.”
Following the Supreme Court ruling, various scholars from different schools of thought presented their detailed stance, led by Maulana Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani and Mufti Muneeb ur Rehman, which encompassed both legal and religious arguments. In their concluding remarks, they also urged emotional and irresponsible individuals:
“We humbly request the scholars and orators to engage with dignity, decorum, and Islamic ethics when discussing the court’s decision. Insulting and abusive language tarnishes the image of religious figures and harms our greatest cause.”
These actions fostered an environment conducive to meaningful dialogue with state institutions, resulting in a key outcome: during the August 22 hearing, where the federal government sought clarification on the Supreme Court’s decision, Maulana Fazl ur Rehman and Mufti Taqi Usmani played a prominent role. Without any inappropriate behavior or harsh language, the Deobandi leadership successfully persuaded the court in favor of their viewpoint, and the court announced the removal of the controversial paragraphs from the earlier ruling in a brief order.
After the decision, many legal experts raised concerns about the ruling, which may be technically valid. However, the matter also has a political dimension. From a political standpoint, it appears that state institutions and the Deobandi leadership have managed the situation with wisdom and maturity, preventing it from escalating into a major crisis. It can be said that the Deobandi leadership successfully navigated the three challenges it faced in this case.
As for the legal implications of the ruling, since the specific paragraphs removed from the previous decisions have not been identified in the brief order, it is premature to comment on them. The specific paragraphs mentioned on some news channels have not been explicitly stated in the order and may simply be speculation, though possibly accurate. However, the real situation will only become clear when the detailed judgment is issued. Only then will it be possible to assess how the removal of those paragraphs affects the overall interpretation of the law and whether it differs from or aligns with the judiciary’s previous interpretations. Nevertheless, it can be said that if the responsible religious scholars present in court were consulted in making the decision, the major objection from religious circles—that some paragraphs seemed to permit Ahmadis to proselytize to Muslims in their private homes—will likely be addressed, as this is clearly against the law.
At this stage, it seems appropriate to draw the attention of the senior Deobandi leadership to some important considerations.
in my 2019 article, I highlighted one particular strength and capability of the Deobandi leadership in the following words:
“For any group to play a leadership role in society, it must possess certain intellectual and practical qualities. One of the most important of these is the ability to maintain a relationship with other groups, despite differences, and to recognize and accept common grounds for mutual interaction. This characteristic is perhaps most evident in the Deobandi disposition, as demonstrated by several examples, and is a key reason for the distinction they have achieved in the field of religious thought and practice.” (Monthly Al-Shariah, January 2019)
In light of the recent Mubarak Sani case, it is pertinent to refer to a brief but important letter written by Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi (may Allah have mercy on him) to Maulana Sami- ul-Haq (may Allah have mercy on him) in response to his query. This letter was published in the special edition of the magazine Al-Haq. Maulana Hazarvi offered three fundamental pieces of advice to the religious circles regarding the Ahmadi issue:
1. The constitutional decision taken (in 1974) is sufficient. This meant that there was no need to burden the state with unnecessary demands regarding this matter. 2. Refrain from targeting state officials with religious accusations, curses, and fatwas. 3. Do not turn this issue into a matter of personal prestige, meaning that it should not be used as a tool to strengthen political or religious influence.
The text of the letter is as follows:
“Dear brother Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, Assalam u alaikum wa Rahmat ullah wa Barakatuh,
I received your esteemed letter. Allah Almighty has dealt with the Qadiani issue. Now, their status is like other disbelievers—such as Sikhs, Parsis, Christians, and Hindus. Issues like marriage have been resolved, and they cannot become members of our parliament, among other matters. We should hope that the remaining issues will also be resolved. I am strongly opposed to the rhetoric of some self-interested individuals who claim that the government has become pro-Qadiani or is delaying action. My dear brother, what has been done is sufficient. As for the rest, I believe that the Qadiani issue has ended. We cannot turn this issue into a matter of personal prestige. We will act according to the needs of the religion as they arise. May Allah give us the strength to do so.
May Allah grant us the ability (to do good). (18th October 1974)”
These three pieces of advice were timely and crucial, yet unfortunately, religious circles largely ignored them. The situation deteriorated because the senior religious leadership’s attention was not consistently focused on the issue, allowing lower-level organizational structures to become increasingly autonomous in determining their strategies and objectives.
Throughout various stages of the Mubarak Sani case, I consistently tried to draw the attention of the responsible religious leadership to this aspect. For instance, on April 25, I wrote on social media:
“The issues of Khatm-e-Nabuwwat (Finality of Prophethood) and blasphemy have, in essence, slipped out of the hands of senior and responsible scholars and have fallen into the hands of organizational adventurers. For quite some time now, different factions have been attempting legal or judicial ‘achievements’ on their own to gain applause, forcing responsible forums or personalities to stand by them.
Last year, when an attempt was made to prevent Ahmadis from keeping copies of the Quran in their homes, the Supreme Court ruled against it—this was a similar case. The current case, which sought to criminalize the distribution of Tafseer-e-Sagheer, follows the same pattern. I can say with responsibility that none of the elders or scholars who are now criticizing the court ruling were familiar with this case or its details beforehand. … I appeal to the responsible leadership to take control of such matters and establish a consultation forum, so the entire religious community does not have to repeatedly face embarrassment due to the rash actions of a few individuals.”
Before the revised Supreme Court decision was issued, on June 1, I posted another message on social media, saying:
“Courts often take political situations into account. Therefore, we believe that the religious groups should be offered some face-saving options to prevent them from getting caught up in a win-or-lose battle and instead give them a chance to pause and reflect on the entire situation. There are certainly elements within the religious groups who understand the situation correctly, but in an atmosphere of emotional tension and confrontation, it becomes difficult for them to play any role. I believe that the senior Deobandi leadership, in the event of some easing of this crisis, could play a role in determining the future strategies of the semi-autonomous lower-level organizations and impose certain restrictions. If the leadership realizes the seriousness and delicacy of the situation, it is hoped that positive pathways will emerge from this crisis. InshaAllah.”
In light of the recent experience with the Mubarak Sani case, we believe that the senior religious leadership must now seriously address this aspect and take appropriate measures to prevent further escalation of such issues in the future.
The behavior and discourse of religious groups must reflect an understanding of the reality that, while all Muslims agree on the belief in the Finality of Prophethood (Khatm-e-Nabuwwat), there is clear disagreement on how to politically and legally deal with those who deny it. Religious scholars or organizations cannot monopolize this issue and impose their perspective on the state and society. In this matter, the state is also a stakeholder, as are the religious scholars as “one” stakeholder, other segments of society, and the Ahmadi community itself, which is a stakeholder as citizens and a minority group in the country. For a balanced and workable resolution of this dispute, the perspectives of all these parties must be given due importance.
In this regard, we must always remember the lesson of our national history and politics, particularly since the 1980s, that promoting various forms of political or religious radicalization and using this process to maintain power has been a tried-and-tested method of our establishment. In the religious sphere, Sunni, Shia, Deobandi, Barelvi, Ahl-e-Hadith, and Jamaat- e-Islami groups have all, in one way or another, been through this process, and the possibilities are not yet exhausted. The price of this process is borne by society, and in some cases, even the establishment becomes affected, but the situation remains beneficial for them as long as a group can be used for their objectives. When that group begins to overstep its bounds, the establishment reappears as the savior to protect the state.
The price that religion must pay, as a civilizational force—and this price has already begun to be paid—is that, at the societal level, religion faces alienation or atheism, and at the state level, secularization increases. When religion becomes an active, angry force, it loses its appeal to thoughtful and constructive minds. When one religious group after another becomes radicalized and insists on imposing its will on the state and society, the state’s tolerance will eventually reach its limit, and secularization will gain strength.
(With thanks to: www.madrasadiscourses.org)