Were the Quraysh Afraid of the Caliphate of Banu Hashim?

Since pre-Islamic times, the political and religious leadership of the Quraysh rested with Banu Abd Manaf. The political leadership was held by Banu Abd Shams, and this remained with the descendants of his son, Umayyah, while the religious responsibilities were undertaken by Banu Hashim. These two clans, united under the common ancestry of Banu Abd Manaf, were allies and considered one cohesive entity against their rivals. Due to frequent intermarriages, they were bound through in-law, maternal, and paternal relations. Their chiefs were often close friends, confidants, and protectors of one another.

The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) was from Banu Hashim, and in his person, both religious and political authority were united. After the Prophet (PBUH), Banu Abd Manaf naturally desired that political authority remain with them, as before. In particular, within Banu Hashim arose the aspiration that, since sovereignty had first come to their family, its continuation should remain therein. The problem, however, was that among Banu Hashim, there was no one who could be presented as a universally acceptable candidate for the caliphate. The only available contender was Ali ibn Abi Talib (RA), a young man of about thirty at the time, without an established political career. Nonetheless, by virtue of his kinship and marital relation with the Prophet (PBUH), he could be advanced as a candidate.

However, within the community formed by the Prophet (PBUH), the traditional criteria for leadership had undergone a significant transformation. Those who had long accompanied the Prophet (PBUH) in his mission, made sacrifices, and distinguished themselves in managing the collective affairs of Muslims were naturally regarded as more deserving of leadership. Among them, the most prominent were Abu Bakr (RA) — from Banu Taym — and Umar (RA) — from Banu Adi. These were comparatively smaller clans among Quraysh.

Both Banu Hashim and Banu Umayyah’s leaders had initially opposed Islam and were late in embracing it. Hence, to the emerging Muslim community, they were not yet acceptable as leaders. Consequently, the chief of Banu Hashim, al-Abbas (RA); the chief of Banu Umayyah, Abu Sufyan; and their ally from Banu Asad, al-Zubayr ibn al-Awwam (RA) — whose mother, Safiyyah bint Abd al-Muttalib, was the Prophet’s paternal aunt — all endeavored, immediately after the Prophet’s passing, to establish Ali (RA) from Banu Hashim as the caliph, since he was the most viable candidate among them.

‘Uthman ibn Affan (RA) of Banu Umayyah — elder in age and highly esteemed for his wealth and generosity — could have been a more fitting caliphal candidate for Banu Abd Manaf, but he was not himself seeking the position, nor could the Muslims have preferred him over Abu Bakr and Umar (RA). Thus, despite his youth and limited political standing, Ali (RA) emerged as a claimant to the caliphate.

When, at the time of the third caliph’s election, consensus was reached upon ‘Uthman (RA), the leadership of the Quraysh and the Muslim polity once again returned to Banu Abd Manaf. Yet even then, the caliphate did not go to Banu Hashim. Later, when finally a member of Banu Hashim, Ali (RA), ascended to the caliphate, the Quraysh did not fully accept his authority.

The Quraysh’s reluctance in this regard stemmed from other reasons: they were displeased by Ali’s (RA) delay in pursuing the qisas (retribution) for ‘Uthman’s murder and by his perceived leniency toward the rebels. Yet, it was this situation that fostered the impression that the Quraysh, from the very beginning, had conspired to keep Banu Hashim away from the caliphate. This notion gained strength from certain historical reports in which Ali (RA) and Umar (RA) themselves alluded to this perception, as well as from the well-known incident during the election of the first caliph, when Umar (RA) intervened and disrupted a meeting of Banu Abd Manaf that was deliberating on appointing Ali (RA) as caliph.

Regarding the Quraysh’s attitude toward Banu Hashim, the following report is attributed to Ali (RA):

ٍفَتَقُولُ: إِنْ وُل ِيَ عَلَيْكُمْ بَنُو هَاشِمٍ لَمْا تَخْرُجْ مِنْهُمْ أَبَداا، وَمَا كَانَتْ فِي غَيْرِهِمْ مِنْ قُرَيْش ْتَدَاوَلْتُمُوهَا بَيْنَكُم. You say that if the leadership is given to Banu Hashim, it will never leave them. But if it remains among other clans of Quraysh, it will circulate among you. (Tarikh al-Tabari 4/233)

A similar report is narrated from Umar (RA):

Abd Allah ibn Abbas narrated: I once traveled with Umar. On the way, he asked me, ‘Do you know why your people (Banu Hashim) were excluded from the matter of the caliphate?’ I said I did not. He said, ‘I know the reason — they disliked that prophethood and caliphate be combined in your family.’” (Ansab al-Ashraf, al-Baladhuri, 10/378)

Based on these reports, Dr. Ammar Khan Nasir has stated that although, given the stature of Abu Bakr (RA) and Umar (RA), it was not possible for Ali (RA) to be chosen as caliph, even if there had been a man among Banu Hashim equal to these great Companions, the Quraysh would still have hesitated to select him. (See: Video Series “Tafhim al-Athar,” Episode 56.)

However, this assumption — that even if a person of the caliber of Abu Bakr or Umar had existed among Banu Hashim, the Quraysh would have conspired to keep him from the caliphate — is not only speculative but also a serious accusation. The reality is that there was no suitable candidate for the caliphate among Banu Hashim at the time, such that the Quraysh would have needed to scheme to exclude him. This is precisely why Banu Hashim were never seriously discussed — positively or negatively — in the first two caliphal selections.

If one accepts the idea that the Quraysh deliberately worked to keep Banu Hashim away from the caliphate, it would raise doubts about the integrity and honesty of those leading the Quraysh — the foremost of the Companions at that time. Yet, when viewed in historical context, this impression is dispelled. In fact, as will become clear from the evidence that follows, it was through the support and mentorship of the caliphs themselves that Ali (RA) eventually became capable of being considered for leadership. His natural temperament and intellectual orientation were such that they initially stood in the way of political prominence. Just as he did not play a central political role during the Prophet’s (PBUH) lifetime, he remained on the periphery of political affairs during the periods of the preceding caliphs as well.

This can be seen from the following details:

During the Prophet’s (PBUH) lifetime, Ali (RA) neither held any official position nor, except on one or two occasions, was entrusted with administrative responsibility. Even when the Prophet (PBUH) left Madinah, he was never appointed as his deputy there. During the expedition of Tabuk, Ali (RA) was assigned to look after the affairs of Banu Hashim, while Muhammad ibn Maslamah (RA) was appointed as the Prophet’s acting representative in Madinah.³⁶

Until the later years of the Prophetic period, Ali (RA) still regarded himself as an inexperienced youth, and the Prophet (PBUH) did not dispute this self-assessment. The following narration illustrates this:

،عن علي، قال: بعثني رسول ّٰللاه صلى ّٰللاه عليه وسلم إلى اليمن قاضياا، فقلت: يا رسول ّٰللاه ، ترسلني وانا حديث السن وْل علم لي بالقضاء، فقال: ’’إن ّٰللاه سيهدي قلبك، ويثبت لسانك، فإذا جلس بين يديك الخصمان فًل تقضين حتى تسمع

من اَلخر كما سمعت من اْلول فإنه احرى ان يتبين لك القضاء‘‘، قال: فما زلت قاضياا او ما شككت في قضاء بعد. Ali (RA) said: The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) sent me as a judge to Yemen. I said, ‘O Messenger of Allah, you are sending me as a judge while I am still young and have no knowledge of judicial matters.’ He (PBUH) replied, ‘Allah will guide your heart and keep your tongue firm. When two parties appear before you, do not decide until you have heard the other side as you have heard the first — for that is most likely to make the judgment clear to you.’ Ali said: After that, I continued to give judgments, and I never doubted any judgment I made.’ (Abu Dawood, No. 3582)

Here, the Prophet (PBUH) acknowledged and encouraged Ali’s (RA) potential in judicial matters — the ability to decide legal cases — not necessarily the administrative or political experience required for statecraft. Prior to becoming caliph, Ali (RA) never had an opportunity to acquire that kind of political experience.

Swordsmanship was his strength, but he was never appointed as the commander of an army. In the Battle of Khaybar, he conquered Qamus,³⁷ a subfort of the larger fortress Katibiyyah — and this was his main contribution to that campaign.

For these reasons, during the elections of the first two caliphs, no one among the general body of Muslims even mentioned Ali (RA) as a candidate.

During the eras of the caliphs as well, Ali (RA) neither held any governmental office nor participated in any military expeditions abroad. He played no role in the series of conquests that took place across various fronts. Nevertheless, his gradual rise in political stature was entirely due to the patronage and mentorship of the caliphs themselves.This becomes evident from the following facts:

Abu Bakr (RA) appointed Ali (RA) as the commander of a contingent responsible for the defense of Madinah and, for the first time, included him in collective consultations on state affairs.

Umar (RA) maintained a special relationship with the Prophet’s (PBUH) family and consistently gave them precedence in matters of honor and respect. He granted to Ali (RA) and his sons stipends equal to those of the senior Companions (Kitab al-Kharaj, pp. 43–44).

From the income of the fay lands of Banu Nadir and Fadak, the share allocated to dhu al-qurba (the Prophet’s relatives) continued as per established practice, and Ali (RA) was entrusted with the responsibility of distributing this wealth (Kitab al-Kharaj, p. 30). Umar (RA) also strengthened Ali’s financial standing by granting him the estates of Yanbuʿ and other lands (al-Kharaj, Yahya ibn Adam, p. 73).

During the caliphate of Uthman (RA), when the treasury expanded greatly, Ali (RA) was given a larger share of allowances than others (al-Tabaqat al-Kubra 5/46–47). Ali (RA) spent generously from this wealth on the people, which further increased his popularity and public support.

Umar (RA) made Ali (RA) a regular participant in political consultations and frequently appointed him as his deputy in Madinah whenever he left for travel. Thus, Umar (RA) played the most important role in cultivating Ali’s political training and enhancing his stature among the people. As a result, by the time of the third caliph’s election, Ali (RA) was included among the candidates for the caliphate.

Umar (RA) even expressed his personal wish that the caliphate might pass to Ali (RA) after him,³⁸ though he feared it might not happen—not because the Quraysh opposed Ali’s candidacy, but because other senior Companions, whose religious, communal, and political services were more prominent, were also in consideration. These distinguished men were part of the shura (electoral council). However, when three of them withdrew their candidacies, the two remaining contenders were Uthman (RA) and Ali (RA). Uthman (RA), being older and more distinguished in service, was elected. Among those who withdrew, two—Talha (RA) from Banu Taym and Zubayr (RA) from Banu Asad—cast their votes in favor of Ali (RA). Umar (RA) himself had already expressed preference for him. Thus, a large segment of the Quraysh leadership stood in support of Ali (RA).

In summary: there was no suitable candidate for the caliphate among Banu Hashim. Yet, during the first caliphal election, the most powerful Quraysh clan, Banu Umayyah, and their allies, Banu Asad, sought to make Ali (RA)—a member of Banu Hashim—the caliph. Later, during the reigns of the subsequent caliphs, even though Ali (RA) neither held office nor performed state service, his political stature was continuously nurtured until, at the time of the third caliph’s election, prominent Quraysh leaders such as Umar (RA), Zubayr (RA), and Talha (RA) were among his supporters.

No self-admitted statement from the Quraysh exists to substantiate the accusation that they collectively sought to exclude Banu Hashim from the caliphate. In none of the discussions surrounding any caliphal election is there mention of any deliberate intent to bar them. There was no need for such an exclusion, since there was, in truth, no qualified candidate among Banu Hashim on merit—nor among Banu Umayyah either. Even Uthman (RA), despite his dignity and virtue, was not initially seen as a competitor. Therefore, it is inconceivable that any scheme or conspiracy would have been necessary to prevent a member of Banu Hashim from attaining the caliphate.

Umar’s (RA) comment regarding this perception about the Quraysh represents his personal opinion, which may be understood in light of his deep emotional attachment to the Prophet’s (PBUH) family. However, if the above-mentioned accusation against the Quraysh—that they excluded Banu Hashim from the caliphate—were to apply to anyone, it would most logically apply to Umar (RA) himself, since he was the one who prevented the gathering of Banu Abd Manaf from appointing Ali (RA) as caliph during the selection of the first caliph. Yet Umar (RA) never considered himself guilty of such an act—and rightly so—because he did not merely restrain Banu Abd Manaf, but also the Ansar, from independently appointing a caliph without the collective consultation of the

Companions. His sole intention was to ensure that the nascent Muslim community did not fall into political discord at its very inception.

If the charge of excluding Banu Hashim from the caliphate could be laid against anyone, it might be directed toward Banu Umayyah—given their later conflicts with the descendants of Ali (RA). Yet, even they were initially part of the effort to appoint Ali (RA) as caliph under the tribal solidarity of Banu Abd Manaf.

Even if some within the Quraysh entertained the notion that if the caliphate passed to Banu Hashim, it would permanently remain under their control, the conduct of their leading figures contradicted this idea. It was, in fact, through their consistent support and encouragement that Ali (RA)—despite lacking any significant record of political service—rose to become a credible candidate for the caliphate.

The suspicion that the Quraysh wished to exclude Banu Hashim from leadership would only hold weight if Banu Hashim had produced a figure comparable in stature to Abu Bakr (RA) or Umar (RA) and yet he had been deliberately ignored.

If individuals like Abu Bakr (RA) and Umar (RA)—who belonged to relatively less powerful clans of the Quraysh—were chosen as caliphs due to their extraordinary religious devotion and political service to the Prophet (PBUH), then had there been anyone of equal caliber within Banu Hashim, it would have been inconceivable for him to be overlooked, especially given that he would have enjoyed the strong political backing of Banu Abd Manaf and their established tradition of leadership.